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NOTES
THE NEW MEXICO BAR ADMISSION LOYALTY
OATH: A STUDY IN UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
The First Amendment provides the only kind of security system that
can preserve a free government-one that leaves the way wide open
for people to favor, discuss, advocate, or incite causes and doctrines
however obnoxious and antagonisticsuch views may be to the rest of
us.-Mr. Justice Hugo Black'

Rule 12 of the rules governing admission to the New Mexico
bar provides:
12. The Board of Bar Examiners shall not permit any applicant to
take an examination or move any applicant's admission on motion unsubscribe to an oath that he is not
less such applicant shall first take and
2
a member of the Communist Party.
The oath actually administered goes even further and requires
an affidavit reading "
, being first duly sworn,
on oath deposes and states: That
he is not now nor has
he ever been a member of the Communist Party." However, it

will be assumed for the purposes of the following constitutional
analysis that a failure to check the space indicating no past membership would not result in the absolute bar to admission imposed

by Rule 12 explicitly for present membership, since the unconstitutionality of such a result has long been resolved. This Note will
focus on the constitutionality of a denial of admission to the practice of law for failure to take an oath on non-membership in the

Communist Party.
I
HISTORY OF BAR ADMISSION LOYALTY REQUIREMENTS

With a few sporadic exceptions following the Civil War and
World War I, there was little concern with testing the loyalty or
patriotism of lawyers until the advent of the Cold War.' Manifesting the fear of Communism characteristic of that era, the

American Bar Association adopted a number of anti-Communist
resolutions, including one which called for disbarment proceedings
1. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 344 (1956) (separate opinion).
2. Rules Governing Bar Examiners, Bar Examinations and Admission to the Bar
of the State of New Mexico, published by Lowell C. Green, Clerk of the Supreme
Court of New Mexico (25th ed. 1968).
3. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
4. V. Countryman and T. Finman, The Lawyer in Modern Society 822 (1966).
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against "all lawyers who are members of the Communist Party of
the United States or who advocate Marxism-Leninism." ' The
loyalty test cases arising since then indicate that many states now
concern themselves with the loyalty of bar applicants, by use of an
oath,' questions on application forms, 7 or oral inquiries during
character committee interviews.'
The justification underlying loyalty tests for lawers has seldom
been clearly articulated. One suggested rationale has been that a
lawyer has a special duty to support our constitutional system and
to dedicate himself to legal methods of change. 9 The justification
most often used by the courts, however, is that disloyalty or subversiveness may show a lack of the moral fitness required in all
jurisdictions as a prerequisite to the practice of law.
Determining what will disqualify an applicant for lack of good
moral character is a difficult task at best. The standards, other than
the phrase "good moral character," are not often specified; and
even when they are, they are uncertain in application." But even
greater problems arise when political and social beliefs are inquired into in the course of a determination of moral fitness.
In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners," the New Mexico
Board of Bar Examiners had refused to permit an applicant to
take the bar examination on the ground that he had not shown
"good moral character." One basis for the Board's determination
was Schware's former membership in the Communist Party. The
Supreme Court of the United States held unanimously that the
State of New Mexico had deprived him of due process of law,
because none of the facts justified a finding that Schware was morally unfit to practice law. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court,
stated:
5. 76 A.B.A. Rep. 530-32, 586-87 (1951).
6. E.g., New Mexico.
7. E.g., California (see 55 Cal. L. Rev. 407 (1967)); and New York (see Law
Students Civil Research Council v. Wadmond, 291 F. Supp. 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), in
which several constitutional challenges to questions on character committee questionnaires were held to be substantial enough to warrant convening a three-judge district
court).
8. Brown and Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev.
480 (1953).
9. Id. An intriguing criticism of this justification may be found in Countryman,
Loyalty Tests for Lawyers, 13 Law. Guild Rev. 149 (1953), in which the distinction
between a belief in a principle of legality in the practice of law and a belief in a
principle of legality as a means of governmental change is developed.
10. Consider, for example, the following: "The test is whether that behavior truly
portrays an inherent and fixed quality of character of an unsavory, dishonest, debased and corrupt nature." In re Monaghan 126 Vt. 53,-, 222 A.2d 665, 671 (1966).
11. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any
other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due
Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
[Citing cases]. A State can require high standards of qualification,
such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits
an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational
con12
nection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law.
The Court found no such rational connection between past membership in itself and moral fitness, because, assuming that some
Party members had illegal aims and engaged in illegal activities,
"it cannot automatically be inferred that all members shared their
evil purposes or participated in their illegal conduct." "aThe Board
had, therefore, indiscriminately classified innocent and knowing
activity together, which was constitutionally impermissible.
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California 14 decided the same day,
reinforced the Schware holding. Konigsberg had been denied a
certificate to practice law on the grounds he had failed to prove
(1) that he was of good moral character, and (2) that he did
not advocate the forcible overthrow of the Government.1 5 These
findings had been based on the testimony of an ex-Communist to
the effect that Konigsberg had once attended Party meetings and
on his refusal to answer questions concerning his alleged membership in the Communist Party. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (I) that even if he had been a party member, that fact alone
would not support an inference that he did not have good moral
character, and (2) that his refusal to answer questions about his
political affiliations and opinions did not warrant an inference of
bad character.
Several state court cases have faced problems similar to those
encountered in Schware and Konigsberg. In none of them has the
mere fact of past membership been held sufficient to deny admission. 6 Only one case has been found in which past membership
12. Id. at 238-39.
13. Id. at 246.
14. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
15. California Business and Professions Code . 6064.1 (1937) barred any person
advocating forcible overthrow of the government from admission to the practice of law.
The Court found it unnecessary to rule on the constitutionality of this statute.
16. See, e.g., Character Committee v. Mandras, 233 Md. 285, 196 A.2d 630 (1964)
(Court of Appeals affirmed Board of Law Examiners' reversal of Character Committee's finding of moral unfitness based on past Party membership); In re Application of Jolles, 235 Or. 262, 383 P.2d 388 (1963) (Oregon Supreme Court reversed
decision of Board of Bar Examiners denying application of an ex-member who had
been active in the Party and fully aware of its nature) ; cf. In re Schlesinger, 404 Pa.
584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961) (Party membership held insufficient to justify disbarment).
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of any nature has resulted in denial. In Application of Patterson,x7
the Oregon Supreme Court, acknowledging that membership alone
afforded no rational basis for a finding that one shared the Party's
illegal aims, refused admission to a former Party leader who had
been expelled without just cause. Although the court stated that
his activities and position justified an inference of knowledge of the
Party's aims and an intent to carry them out, the finding rested
primarily on the court's belief that he testified falsely under oath
when he said the Party was nothing more than a political party
dedicated to the use of democratic processes.
While it is true that neither Schware nor Konigsberg nor the
state cases faced the question whether present membership in the
Communist Party would justify a finding of moral unfitness, 8 the
rationale expressed in the cases is equally applicable to both present
and past membership. The indiscriminate grouping of innocent
with knowing behavior and non-participation with participation in
illegal activities is violative of due process in either case.
The Konigsberg case returned to the United States Supreme
Court some four years later, in a slightly different legal posture. 9
On remand, Konigsberg had again refused to answer any questions
at the Bar Committee hearings relating to his membership in the
Communist Party. Even though he stated unequivocally his disbelief in violent overthrow, denied having ever knowingly been
a member of any organization advocating such actions, and introduced further unrebutted evidence as to his good moral character,
the Committee again declined to certify him. This time, however,
the ground was that his refusals to answer had obstructed a full
investigation into his qualifications.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the result on somewhat narrow grounds. Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority, stated that the Due Process Clause did not forbid denial
of admission so long as the applicant refused "to provide unprivileged answers to questions having a substantial relevance to his
17. 213 Or. 398, 318 P.2d 907 (1957).
18. But cf. Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d
76 (1966). Applicant had been arrested numerous times for acts of civil disobedience
and, along with membership in other controversial organizations, had been an organizer of the W.E.B. DuBois Club. The California Supreme Court held that the applicant's present belief in the principles of civil disobedience did not show the moral
turpitude necessary for a finding of unfitness. " . . . [O]pinions of the United States
Supreme Court and of our court which characterize a claim for admission to the bar
as a claim of a right entitled to the protections of procedural due process [citing
cases] make it impossible for us to regard admission to the profession as a mere
privilege." 55 Cal. Rptr. at 233, 421 P.2d at 81, n.3.
19. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 9

qualifications." 20 As is the case in most states, California placed
the burden of showing good moral character on the applicant .2
After the applicant furnished enough evidence of good character
to establish a prima facie case, the Committee could rebut with
evidence of bad character. Since the Committee, generally unable
to conduct an independent investigation, had to rely largely on
its interrogation during the character hearings, an applicant's
refusal to answer obstructed it in performing its proper function.
After indicating that an answer by Konigsberg, either affirmative or negative, to the questions concerning Party membership
would have provided no constitutional basis for disqualification,
the majority took the position that the answer could have opened
lines of inquiry leading to valid grounds for disqualification. Therefore, even though an unfavorable inference as to the subjects of
the questions could not be drawn from refusal to answer, the refusal could be treated as an obstruction of the investigation warranting denial of the application.
In answer to the contention that the questions unconstitutionally
impinged on rights of free speech and association protected by
the First Amendment, the majority applied its familiar balancing
test :
As regards the questioning of public employees relative to Communist
Party membership it has already been held that the interest in not
subjecting speech and association to the deterrence of subsequent disclosure is outweighed by the State's interest in ascertaining the fitness
of the employee for the post he holds, and hence that such questioning
does not infringe constitutional protections. Beilan v. Board of Public
Education, 357 U.S. 399; Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341

U.S. 716. With respect to this same question of Communist Party
membership, we regard the State's interest in having lawyers who
are devoted to the law in its broadest sense . .. as clearly sufficient
by
to outweigh the minimal effect upon free association occasioned
22
compulsory disclosure in the circumstances here presented.

In re Anastaplo

3

a companion case, involved similar issues and

resulted in an identical division of the Court. The only significant
20. Id. at 44.
21. Despite the lip service paid to the placing of this burden, it has been questioned
whether the burden of persuasion, as opposed to the burden of production, may be
constitutionally placed on the applicant. See Note, Character Hearings for Bar Applicants, 15 Stan. L. Rev. 500 (1963). As to matters touching First Amendment rights,
it appears that neither burden may be placed on the applicant. This is discussed in
more detail in Section IIC, infra.
22. 366 U.S. at 52.
23. 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
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difference was that in Anastaplo there was not the slightest indication of bad character or subversive associations; in fact, the
evidence was overwhelmingly to the contrary. 24 The result, however, was based on the same fact that disposed of Konigsbergthe refusal to answer questions concerning membership in the Communist Party and other organizations.2 5
Konigsberg II and Anastaplo are of doubtful vitality today.26
They relied on a line of cases 21 which permitted the denial of
public employment to persons engaging in or refusing to disclose
non-criminal advocacy or association on the theory that the purpose
was not punishment, but the protection of the public. Those cases
have all since been overruled, 28 either expressly or sub silentio.2 9
The Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the constitutionality of denying admission to the bar on the ground of an applicant's
present membership in the Communist Party. However, constitutional development in closely related areas, particularly in this decade, points to several serious constitutional defects in the New
Mexico oath requirement.
II

CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECTS OF THE NEW MEXICO OATH

J.

Overbreadth

Probably the most striking defect in the New Mexico bar admission non-membership oath lies in its overbreadth. An analysis
of the overbreadth doctrine developed by the Supreme Court in
cases involving loyalty requirements, particularly as applied to Com24. Mr. Justice Black, in his searing dissent, said: "The legal profession will lose
much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like
these." 366 U.S. at 115.
25. The inquiry was sparked by part of an answer Anastaplo had written on the
personal history form. In stating what he thought to be principles underlying the
United States Constitution, he had included some language from the Declaration of
Independence relating to the right of the people to abolish a non-responsive government.
26. But even if they were still reliable statements of Constitutional doctrine, they
would provide no support for the self-executing oath prescribed in Rule 12. This
point is discussed in Section IIIB, infra.
27. E.g., Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958) ; Adler v.
Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341
U.S. 716 (1951) ; Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) ; and American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
28. Good discussions of this observation may be found in Circuit Judge Skelly
Wright's concurring opinion in Haskett v. Washington, 294 F. Supp. 912, 915 (D.D.C.
1968), and in 55 Cal. L. Rev. 407 (1967). Many of the overruling cases are discussed
in Section II.
29. The later cases referred to in footnote 26 have probably also overruled Konigsberg II and Anastaplo sub silentio.
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munist Party membership, properly begins with the Smith Act 3° and
the Subversive Activities Control Act.3 1
In Scales v. United States 32 the Court reviewed the conviction of
a Communist Party member under the Smith Act clause 33 proscribing membership in organizations advocating the violent overthrow of the government. In order to save the clause from serious
constitutional doubt, the majority found it necessary to construe the
An interesting observation, though admittedly of little probative value, involves
the relationship between these two cases and Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961),
in which the Court upheld disbarment of an attorney for invoking the privilege
against self-incrimination during a judicial inquiry into professional misconduct. The
three cases were argued on the same day, decided on the same day, and resulted
in identical divisions of the Court. In Cohen, the majority tied its decision to the
other two decisions: "We granted certiorari because the case presented still another
variant of the issues arising in the Konigsberg and Anastaplo cases" (at 122) ; and
"[the contention] that the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the State from making
his refusal to answer the inquiry's questions a ter se ground for disbarment ....
must be rejected largely in light of our today's opinions in the Konigsberg and
Anastaplo cases" (at 123). Five years later, the Court again faced the Cohen fact
situation in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1966). Spevack expressly overruled
Cohen, the Court holding that the self-incrimination clause "extends its protection
to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered down
by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a
price for asserting it." 385 U.S. at 514.
Aside from the observation of its circumstantial relation to Konigsberg II and
Anastaplo, Spevack is important in considering another issue that can arise in bar
admission loyalty inquiries: May an applicant be denied admission for invoking the
privilege against self-incrimination during these inquiries? This issue was not involved in Konigsberg II and Anastaplo, nor could it be raised by the present oath
requirement of Rule 12, since it makes no provision for an admission of membership.
However, since it is intimately connected with the matter of loyalty inquiries in
bar admissions, a few brief remarks will be made in this footnote.
Spevack held that the privilege's guarantee that one may suffer no penalty for its
exercise is not restricted to those cases in which the penalty is fine or imprisonment.
Rather, it applies to "the imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of the
Fifth Amendment 'costly' " (the costly sanction in Spevack was disbarment for invoking the privilege at a judicial inquiry into "ambulance chasing). 385 U.S. at 515.
As the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out, the rationale of
Spevack allows no distinction between disbarment and denial of admission. According
to that rationale, the refusal to answer questions concerning Party membership
(answers which could constitute the first incriminating link in a chain of evidence
used to obtain a conviction under the various criminal sedition acts) could not be
considered in determining an applicant's qualifications, even under an "obstruction"
theory, if the refusal was based on the privilege against self-incrimination.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2385.
31. 50 U.S.C. § 783. These two acts avoided attaching their sanctions to the Communist Party by name to prevent their invalidation as bills of attainder. See Section
IID, infra.
32. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
33. Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or
assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow of any
such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or
affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the
purposes thereof-
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statute as reaching only "active" members having a guilty knowledge
of the organization's aims and a specific intent "to bring about the
overthrow of the government as speedily as circumstances would
permit." 84 A blanket prohibition of association with a group having both legal and illegal aims, the majority opinion observed,
would create a real danger that constitutionally protected political
expression or association would be inhibited.
The constitutional question avoided in Scales had to be faced in
Aptheker v. Secretary of State,3 5 in which the validity of § 6 of the
Subversive Activities Control Act"' was at issue. The challenged section provided that when an organization is registered or under final
order to register3 7 with the Subversive Activities Control Board, a
member may not lawfully apply for or use a passport. The Court
found § 6 unconstitutional on its face for overbreadth since it, in
effect, established an irrebuttable presumption that all members of
the specified organization would, if given passports, engage in activities inimical to the security of the United States. Thus, even
though the legislation was a result of the congressional desire to protect our national security, it violated the often-stated principle that
"a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of pro38
'
tected freedoms.
The Court noted the absence of criteria such as knowledge concerning the organization, degree of activity in it and commitment
to its purpose, as well as considerations peculiar to Aptheker, such
as purpose of travel and countries to be visited. Because the statute
was clear on its face, any attempt to narrow its overly broad scope
by "construction" would have been impossible without substantial
judicial rewriting. The Court refused to engage in such a case-bycase separation of constitutional from unconstitutional areas of
34. 367 U.S. at 230. The four dissenting justices would not have imposed punishment for anything short of the actual commission of an unlawful act.
The conviction in the companion case of Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961)
of a Party member under the Smith Act was reversed unanimously by the Court, the
only distinction between the two cases being that in Scales, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support a verdict that the Communist Party presently advocated
the violent overthrow of the government, but in Noto, the evidence was insufficient.
What this means is that in each prosecution under the Smith Act for Communist
Party membership, one of the elements that must be proven is the Party's present
advocacy of violent overthrow.
35. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
36. 50 U.S.C. § 783.
37. A final order to the Communist Party had been issued on October 20, 1961.
378 U.S. at 502.
38. 378 U.S. at 508.
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coverage,3 9 explaining that the mere existence of a statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application in the area of vulnerable
First Amendment freedoms might pose a threat of sanctions that
would deter their exercise almost as effectively as the actual application of sanctions.40
As developed in the criminal cases involving Communist Party
membership, then, the overbreadth doctrine prohibited as unconstitutional any sanctions based on a showing of membership alone,
unaccompanied by knowledge of and specific intent to carry out the
organization's unlawful objectives. The danger in such a law lay
in the deterrent effect its very existence had on the legitimate exercise of the freedom of association protected by the First Amendment.
Elfbrandt v. Russell 4' accomplished the transfer of the over-

breadth guidelines formulated in the Communist Party criminal
prosecutions to loyalty oath cases. In Elfbrandt, the oath required
of all Arizona public employees was backed up by a statute subjecting anyone who took the oath and "knowingly and willfully
becomes or remains a member of the Communist Party of the United
States or [other organizations having the purpose of the overthrow of the government]" to discharge and prosecution for perjury." Noting that the constitutional significance of the "specific intent" requirement imposed by Scales had been clearly established
in Aptheker, the Court held that the Arizona oath and supporting
statute suffered "from an identical constitutional infirmity" as the
,4ptheker statute.43 "Those who join an organization but do not
share its unlawful purposes and who do not participate in its unlawful activities surely pose no threat, either as citizens or as public
employees.

'44

39. The Court took the position, conceded as correct by the government, that an
interpretation analogous to that applied in Scales could not be applied here because,
unlike the Smith Act, neither the words nor the history of § 6 suggested limiting its
application to "active" members. 378 U.S. at 511 n. 9.
40. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), applied the reasoning of Aptheker
to a provision of the Act making it unlawful for a member of an organization registered or under final order to register with the Board to engage in any employment
in any defense facility. Again refusing to read active membership and specific intent
into the provision, the Court declared it unconstitutional for overbreadth.
41. 384 U.S. 11 (1965).
42. The statute subjected to perjury prosecution and discharge anyone taking the
oath who "knowingly and willfully becomes or remains a member of the communist
party of the United States or its successors or any of its subordinate organizations"
or "any other organization" having for "one of its purposes" violent overthrow of
the government if the employee knew of the unlawful purpose. 384 U.S. at 13.
43. 384 U.S. at 16.
44. 384 U.S. at 19.
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Any speculation that the Elfbrandt decision may have turned on
the sanction of perjury prosecutions under the Arizona law was

put to rest by the opinion in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 45 the

Court's most comprehensive and authoritative statement to date on
the subject of loyalty legislation. 46 A New York statute made Communist Party membership, as such, prima facie evidence of disqualification from employment in the public school system. The same
provision had been previously sustained by the Court in Adler v.
7 but Keyishian
Board of Education,"
pointed out that constitutional
doctrine developed since that time had rejected its major premisethat public employment may be conditioned on the surrender of
constitutional rights which the government could not abridge by
direct action. If teachers did not choose to work for the school system on the terms of the New York authorities, said Adler, "they
are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere. ' 4 The Keyishian Court replied with a statement from
Sherbert v. Verner: "It is too late in the day to doubt that the
liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of
'49
or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.
In finding the barring of employment to members of the Communist Party unconstitutional for overbreadth, the Court reiterated
its adherence to the "specific intent" requirement applied in Aptheker and Elfbrandt:
Thus, mere Party membership, even with knowledge of the Party's
unlawful goals, cannot suffice to justify criminal punishment (citing
cases) ; nor may it warrant a finding of moral unfittness justifying
disbarment. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S.

S. Ct. 752, 1 L. Ed. 2d 796. (Emphasis added). 50

232, 77

In light of Keyishian and its predecessors, the New Mexico bar
admission oath clearly is unconstitutional for overbreadth. Not only
does it lack a requirement of specific intent to carry out whatever
unlawful goals the Party may have, but it even lacks a requirement
of knowledge of those goals. It flatly forbids admission to the bar
45. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
46. A more recent case, Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967)
to hold a Maryland oath overly broad.

relied on Keyishian

47. 342 U.S. 485 (1952). Adler had been one of the cases principally relied on in
Konigsberg II and Anastaplo.
48. 342 U.S. at 492.

49. 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1962).
50. 385 U.S. at 607. Although Schware was not an overbreadth case, the reasoning
by which it found the denial of admission to be a lack of due process is also basic
to the overbreadth theory.
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for mere present membership in the Communist Party; and this it
cannot do.
There can be no valid state interest which would justify a prohibition so sweeping as to exclude nonactive Party members or those
without specific intent to further any unlawful aims from the practice of law. Certainly the interest of the New Mexico bar in keeping
Communists from practicing law can be no stronger than that of
New York in protecting the integrity of its schools; and Keyishian
held that, conceding some state interest, the loyalty provisions "applicable primarily to activities of teachers, who have captive audiences of young minds, are subject to these constitutional limitations
in favor of freedom of expression and association.",' Nor can the
bar's interest by any greater than that of the United States in protecting its defense facilities, as in United States v. Robel.5 2 If there
can be any legitimate purpose at all in a loyalty requirement for admission to the bar,5" "that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
'54
more narrowly achieved.
B. Right To Hearing
A second defect in the bar admission oath, even if it were not
overly broad, is its self-executing nature. It would be a denial of due
process of law to bar an applicant from admission for failure to
take a loyalty oath without affording a right to a hearing. Even in
the old test oath cases of the early 1950's on which Konigsberg II
and 4nastaplo relied, the court allowed dismissal of non-swearing
employees only after ensuring that the programs involved allowed
the employees a hearing at which they could explain their refusal to
swear, or could rebut any inferences raised by that refusal. 5
In Nostrand v. Little,5 6 the Supreme Court remanded a declaratory judgment suit concerning the Washington state loyalty oath
for a state court determination whether a hearing at which the employee could explain or defend his refusal to take the oath was provided. Without such a hearing, the oath would be unconstitutional
as violative of procedural due process. And, more recently, a
51. Id.
52. Note 40 supra.
53. Which in itself is a matter on which opinions differ. See Countryman, Loyalty
Tests for Lawyers, 13 Law. Guild Rev. 149 (1953).
54. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
55. E.g., Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Board of
Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
56. 362 U.S. 474 (1960). Cf. Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S.
551 (1956).
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three-judge district court struck down on due process grounds an
Idaho loyalty oath statute for state employees because discharge
57
from employment automatically followed refusal to take the oath.
Refusal to execute the New Mexico oath is easily distinguishable
from the refusal to answer during a hearing which justified denial of
admission in the now doubtful Konigsberg II and Anastaplo cases.
In these cases, an acknowledgment of Party membership could have
been made by an affirmative response to the questions, and a denial
of admission need not have resulted. However, with the New
Mexico oath, an acknowledgment of Party membership can be manifested only by a refusal to subscribe to the non-membership oath,
which then results in automatic denial by the clear language of Rule
12.
The Supreme Court has never upheld the kind of self-executing
oath required for admission to the New Mexico bar. Lacking any
provision for a hearing, it is unconstitutional as a violation of due
process.
C. Burden Of Proof
Another constitutional defect in the New Mexico oath, which
would not be cured by a hearing provision alone, is that it unfairly
places on the applicant the burden of showing that his associations
do not go beyond the somewhat shadowy line between the protected
and unprotected.
This issue was first raised in Speiser v. Randall 8 by a California law conditioning receipt of a veterans' property-tax exemption on the execution of a declaration swearing non-advocacy of the
violent overthrow of the government. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the state could deny tax exemptions to
persons advocating violent overthrow, assuming, arguendo, that
the state could do so. The question it did face was whether the
method of determining whether a claimant was in the proscribed
class violated the requirements of due process.
Under the California procedure, the claimant bore the burden of
proving non-advocacy in precisely the same manner as he bore the
burden of proving any other fact bearing on tax liability. The essential features of the procedure were that the applicant had the
burden ( 1 ) of filing a tax return containing the declaration; (2) of
57. Heckler v. Shepard, 243 F. Supp. 841 (D. Idaho 1965). The oath here, as
well as the one in Nostrand, would today be found unconstitutional for overbreadth,
in light of Keyishian.
58. 357 U.S. 513 (1957).
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convincing the assessor, who had subpoena power to carry out his
duty of investigating facts underlying all tax liabilities, as to the
truth of any facts in doubt; and (3) of proving the incorrectness of
the assessor's determinination on judicial review.
While recognizing the fairness of placing the burden of proof on
the taxpayer in most circumstances, the Court held that ordinary
tax assessment procedures could not be used "where the transcendant value of speech is involved."'5 9
Even had the declaration been drawn narrowly enough to penalize only unprotected advocacy, the imposition of the burden on the
claimant threatened protected freedoms as well:
The vice of the present procedure is that, where particular speech
falls close to the line separating the lawful and the unlawful, the
possibility of mistaken factfinding-inherent in all litigation-will
create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be penalized.
The man who knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade
another of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far
wider of the unlawful zone than if the State must bear these burdens.
This is especially to be feared when the complexity of the proofs and
the generality of the standards applied, c.f. Dennis v. United States,

supra, provide but shifting sands on which the litigant must maintain
his position.60

By dictating denial of bar admission to an applicant who does not
subscribe to the oath of non-membership, despite the absence of any
evidence that the applicant is a member, Rule 12 has, in effect, placed
on the applicant the burden of showing that he does not fall within
the forbidden category.
But failure to execute the oath cannot only be impermissible
grounds for denying admission, neither can it be cause for requiring
the applicant to appear before the Board of Bar Examiners and
show by some other means that he does not fall within the prohibited category.61 Even Konigsberg II and Anastaplo provide no
59. 357 U.S. at 526.
60. Id. The Court did distinguish Speiser from the line of cases to be relied on
in Konigsberg II and Anastaplo which had permitted oath programs in public employment situations, on the ground that those programs were aimed at protecting
sensitive positions from subversives, whereas in Speiser, the aim was punishment of
subversives. As shown in Section IIA, infra, however, the Court now applies the
same standards to cases involving criminal punishment as to those involving loyalty
requirements in public employment. As Keyishian pointed out, "[w]hether or not loss
of public employment constitutes 'punishment', [citing cases], there can be no doubt
that the repressive impact of the threat of discharge will be no less direct or insubstantial." 385 U.S. at 607 n. 11.
61. See Haskett v. Washington, 294 F. Supp. 912, 915 (D.D.C. 1968) (concurring).
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authority for such a procedure. The majority expressly stated that,
as distinguished from the burden of proving "good moral character" in general, there was nothing in the record to indicate the
applicants bore the initial burden of production or the ultimate burden of persuasion in "proving the negative. '6 2 The four dissenting
justices felt that the burden had
been so placed, requiring reversal
63
under the authority of Speiser.
The general rule that the burden of proving one's qualifications
for the pratice of law falls on the applicant can be no justification.
As pointed out by the Speiser Court, where a party has an interest
of transcending value at stake, the other party must bear both the
burdens of production and persuasion. Just as the normal burden of
proving qualification for a tax exemption could not be applied when
freedom of speech was at stake, neither can the normal burden of
proving qualification for bar admission be applied when the almost
inseparable freedom of association is at stake. 64 Since Rule 12 imposes that burden, it violates the requirements of due process of
law.
D. Bill Of Attainder
Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution specifically
prohibits the states from enacting any bill of attainder."5 A bill of
attainder is legislation that applies either to named individuals or
to easily ascertainable groups in such a way as to inflict punishment
on them without a judicial trial. 66 Technically, at common law, a
statute inflicting death was a bill of attainder and one inflicting a
lesser punishment was called a bill of pains and penalties. It is well
62. 366 U.S. at 56; 366 U.S. at 95.
63. Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in Konigsberg II is illustrative: "The Court
attempts to distinguish the situations in order to escape the controlling authority of

Speiser. The speciousness of its reasoning is exposed in Mr. Justice Black's dissent.
I would reverse." 366 U.S. at 81 (dissenting).
64. In Keyishian, the Court stated that its disposition of the case made it unneces-

sary to consider whether, even after membership had been shown, the burden placed
on the teachers to come forward with rebutting evidence denying that the organ-

ization advocated forcible overthrow or that the teacher knew of such advocacy was
constitutionally impermissible in light of Speiser. 385 U.S. at 608 n. 13. Circuit Judge

Skelly Wright, in Haskett v. Washington, 294 F. Supp. 912, 915 (D.D.C. 1968) (concurring), surveys current constitutional doctrine and concludes that oath programs
placing on public employees the burden of showing that their speech and associations
do not fall outside protected areas are impermissible.
65. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10: "No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex
post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."
66. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
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settled, however, that within the meaning of the
Constitution bills
7
of attainder include bills of pains and penalties.6
The prohibition against bills of attainder was first applied to
loyalty tests shortly after the Civil War. In Cummings v. Missouri,68 a priest was convicted under a provision of the Missouri

Constitution making it unlawful for anyone to hold any office of
public trust or engage in any of a number of specified professions
without first taking an oath swearing he had not engaged in, or
sympathized with the recent rebellion against the Union. Ex Parte
Garland9 involved a similar federal oath required of attorneys
before they would be permitted to practice in the federal courts.
The Court struck down both oath requirements as legislative acts
inflicting punishment on specific groups and, therefore, contrary to
70
the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder.
In 1950, a bill of attainder objection to Section 9(h) of the
National Labor Relations Act, which barred a union from access to
the National Labor Relations Board unless all its officers filed
affidavits of non-membership in the Communist Party, was rejected
in American Communications Association v. Douds.7" The Court
stressed the preventive, rather than retributive, purpose of the
provision-to forestall future dangerous acts-and held that its
prohibition therefore did not constitute "punishment."
72
The Douds reasoning was put to rest in United States v. Brown
when the Court invalidated Section 504 of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 as a bill of attainder. Enacted to replace the provision approved in Douds, it made it unlawful for Party members, or those who had within the previous five
years been members, from serving as officers of a union. Although
Douds was not specifically overruled, its reasoning was attacked as
a departure from the otherwise consistent interpretation of the bill
of attainder clause by the Supreme Court.7" The Court disagreed
with the Douds prevention-retribution distinction:
It would be archaic to limit the definition of "punishment" to "re67. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866). A good history of the
bill of attainder, including the reasons for its unanimous rejection by the framers of
the Constitution, can be found in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
68. Id.
69. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
70. As alternate grounds, the Court also found the laws to be ex post facto. In
Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1872), a similar oath required for
access to the West Virginia courts was voided as a bill of attainder.
71. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
72. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
73. The dissenting opinion recognized that Douds "is obviously overruled." 381
U.S. at 464.
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tribution." Punishment serves several purposes: retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent-and preventive. One of the reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them from inflicting future
harm, but that does not make imprisonment any the less punish74
ment.
The vice in the statute was that it was not a rule of general appli-

cation stating that persons possessing certain characteristics which
made them likely to cause the harm Congress sought to eliminate
could not hold union office. This would have left to the courts the
adjudicative function of deciding which persons possessed the specified characteristics. Instead, the statute designated the persons
who possessed those characteristics by attaching its sanctions to
members of a specifically named organization, the Communist
Party. In doing so, it expressed an adjudicative determination instead of a legislative rule, and was unconstitutional as a bill of
attainder.
Replying to the contention that membership in the Communist
Party was merely a convenient, shorthand way of expressing the
characteristics of those persons likely to cause political strikes, the
Court relied on the reasoning underlying the overbreadth cases:
In a number of cases, this Court has pointed out the fallacy of the
suggestion that membership in the Communist Party, or any other
political organization, can be regarded as an alternative, but equivalent, expression for a list of undesirable characteristics. For, as the
Court noted in Schneiderman v. United States ....
, "under our traditions beliefs are personal and not a matter of mere association,
and . . .men in adhering to a political party or other organization

notoriously do not subscribe unqualifiedly to all of its platforms or
asserted principles." 75
The defect of the statute in Brown which made it an unconstitutional bill of attainder also afflicts the Rule 12 oath. Instead of
setting forth characteristics which would make one unfit for the
practice of law, it specifically attaches its sanction-denial of admission-to members of a specified group-the Communist Party.
Even though its purpose may be defended as preventive, in keeping
from the practice of law those who are likely to subvert the legal
system, Brown settled that the purpose of a sanction does not affect
its character as punishment.
74. 381 U.S. at 458. The Court went on to provide historical examples of bills of
attainder enacted for preventive purposes.
75. 381 U.S. at 455.

NATURAL

RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 9

Despite the fact that it is acting under authority of the judicial
branch, the Board of Bar Commissioners performs a legislative
type of function when it promulgates rules for admission to the bar.
In specifically naming members of the Communist Party as ineligible
for admission, the Board has departed from its task of formulating
rules of general applicability and strayed in the constitutionally
forbidden area of the bill of attainder.
III
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Even a cursory review of relevant Supreme Court decisions within the last decade can leave little doubt that the oath prescribed
by Rule 12 is unconstitutional. The real tragedy of the oath, however, lies in the fact that it is prescribed and enforced not by an
ordinary state agency, but by one composed wholly of lawyers. To
assume that the State Bar of New Mexico or its Board of Bar
Commissioners are unaware of the oath's unconstitutionality would
necessitate an assumption that they are ignorant of fundamental
principles of constitutional law.
But whether their continued application of the oath requirement
is a result of ignorance or of willful disregard of the Constitution,
it is tragic in either case.76 Lawyers in this country have a special
duty as guardians of the basic rights guaranteed to all citizens. If
anyone should be especially aware of the dictates of the Constitution and particularly insistent on its observance, it should be the
lawyers. That the official body of lawyers in the state is involved
here only accentuates the dereliction of duty.
There is an issue involved here, though, that goes beyond the
question of whether the present oath requirement violates the Constitution. That issue is whether a loyalty inquiry of any sort, even77
one which conforms to minimum constitutional requirements,
should be made in determining an applicant's qualifications to practice law. And that issue will have to be faced whenever the Rule 12
requirement is withdrawn, either voluntarily by the Board of Bar
76. In addition to being a violation of the Attorney's Oath they took to "support
the Constitution of the United States."
77. To conform to those minimum requirements, it appears likely that it can go
no farther than the present Attorney's Oath. In recent years, the only kind of oath
to withstand constitutional attack has been a simple oath to support the constitutions
and laws of the states and the United States. E.g., Knight v. Board of Regents, 269
F. Supp. 339, aff'd mem. 390 U.S. (1968) ; Hosack v. Smiley, 276 F. Supp. 876
(D. Colo. 1967) (three-judge court).
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Commissioners7 8 or as a result of a court's striking it down as unconstitutional.
Inquiring into one's political beliefs and associations has no
proper place in the determination of whether an applicant is fit to
practice law. Short of overt criminal action, a belief in the need for
change, even violent change, of our form of government bears no
rational relation to the manner in which one carries out his duties as
a lawyer. And apart from their serving no real constructive purpose, loyalty inquiries have a definite harmful effect. As Mr. Justice
Black has pointed out,
Loyalty oaths, as well as other contemporary "security measures,"
tend to stifle all forms of unorthodox or unpopular thinking or expression which has played such a vital and beneficial role in the
history of this Nation. The result is a stultifying conformity which
in the end may well turn out to be more destructive to our free
79
society than foreign agents could ever hope to be.

Not only is this sort of inquiry harmful to this nation in general,
but it is particularly harmful to the Bar. The legal profession enriches itself by diversity. Its most honorable moments have been
brought about by lawyers who dared to stand against the tide of
popular opinion to fight for hated causes and hated clients. "To
force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, timeserving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade
0
8

it.'1

Perhaps it is not too much to hope that the New Mexico Bar will
eventually realize that the kind of citizen and the kind of lawyer
it wants are intimately involved with the requirements it chooses to
impose on applicants for admission. Only then can it rise to meet the
obligations imposed by its special role in our society and in our form
of government.
CHARLES WESLEY DANIELS

78. If the Board refuses to act voluntarily, it will ultimately force an applicant
who cannot conscientiously subscribe to the oath to jeopardize his career by challenging the oath in court.
79. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 532 (1958) (concurring).
80. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 115-16 (Black, J., dissenting).

